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Abstract—Cloud computing is a newly emerging paradigm
in which a client pays as it uses computing resources owned
by a cloud provider. Since multiple clients share the cloud’s
resources, they could potentially interfere with each others’ tasks.
Current pricing and resource allocation mechanisms are quite
preliminary (e.g., fixed pricing in Amazon EC2/S3) and do not
take into account the conflict of interests between multiple clients
using the cloud simultaneously. This can lead to clients being
overpriced, depending upon their allocated resources. Further,
these mechanisms do not allow the provider to optimize its
resource utilization.
In this paper, we take the first step towards modeling the
complex client-client and client-provider interactions in a cloud
by using game theory. We define a new class of games called
Cloud Resource Allocation Games (CRAGs). CRAGs solve the
resource allocation problem in clouds using game-theoretic mech-
anisms, ensuring that clients are charged (near) optimal prices
for their resource usage and that resources of the cloud are
used near their optimal capacity. We present the conditions
for reaching various stable equilibria in CRAGs and provide
algorithms that ensure close to optimal performance. We further
provide results of several experiments performed using traces
from PlanetLab and the Parallel Workload Archives which show
that the new mechanisms result in as much as 15% to 88%
increase in performance compared to existing resource allocation
mechanisms like Round-Robin.
I. Introduction
Cloud computing has recently been experiencing high rates
of growth as evident from the deployment of several cloud
infrastructures [1], [3]. It is based on the paradigm that
clients pay only for the resources they use, on demand. Cloud
providers rent their resources to multiple clients concurrently
and typically charge their customers based on the amount
of resources used by them. For example, Amazon EC2 [1]
charges its clients per CPU-hour consumed.
However current pricing strategies are quite preliminary.
They do not take into account the complex interactions be-
tween clients sharing the cloud’s resources. Such interactions
can occur despite the isolation guarantees provided by the
use of virtualization techniques. As a result, a client’s job
can take longer to execute when the cloud is heavily loaded
as opposed to when it is lightly loaded. If a per CPU-hour
consumed pricing scheme is used (like in Amazon EC2), it
could cause the client to pay more under heavy load since the
presence of too many VMs can lead to interference between
the clients’ jobs and thus prolong job completion times. Hence,
allocation mechanisms (e.g. FIFO, Round-Robin etc) used in
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current cloud computing environments can lead to the clients
being charged unfair prices by the cloud.
Resource allocation in clouds is thus an important issue
affecting not only the performance of the cloud but also the
turnaround time experienced by its clients and the prices paid
by them. Existing pricing and scheduling schemes provide no
price-to-performance guarantees to the clients as they cannot
capture the inherent conflict of interests between different
clients. Clients are interested in completing their jobs in the
least possible time with the least possible total cost which is
the amount of money they pay the cloud for the resources
used. The cloud provider, on the other hand, is interested in
maximizing the resource utilization of the cloud and thus its
revenue, which could contradict with the interests of its clients.
These result in unintended client-client and client-provider
interactions which are not captured by existing pricing and
resource allocation mechanisms.
Economic-based approaches are useful to capture the com-
plex interactions between the users of a system. They provide
a socially optimal method to deal with consumer demand.
They can be used to capture the intricacies of problems in
complex, shared systems [23]. In this paper, we take the first
step towards investigating market-based resource allocation
mechanisms that can capture the complex interactions between
multiple clients using the cloud simultaneously. In particular,
we adopt a game-theoretic approach to model the resource
allocation problem in clouds. This allows us to account for
the inherently contradicting interests of the clients and the
provider of the cloud. Economic approaches have earlier been
successfully adopted in shared computing systems [7], [12],
[14], [22].
In this paper, we consider a model that takes into account the
interactions between the clients of a cloud and the performance
seen by them when using the cloud. These important properties
of real cloud environments are not accounted for in [15],
the only work to have applied economic approaches in cloud
computing.. We build upon existing game theoretic models for
practical computing systems [8], [21] and develop a model that
captures the various aspects of cloud computing, i.e., pricing,
resource requests from clients, interactions between clients’
jobs and the interactions between the clients and the cloud
provider.
We introduce and define a new class of games called Cloud
Resource Allocation Games (CRAGs). A CRAG models the
resource allocation problem in clouds as a classical non-
cooperative game [17] in which the clients of a cloud (modeled
as the players of the CRAG) selfishly try to maximize their
utility. We model the utility of a client as the negative of the
cost incurred by the client which captures the total amount
of money the client has to pay the cloud for the resources
used. The cost also captures the turnaround time that a client
experiences if the amount of money paid by it is directly
proportional to its turnaround time (given a desired number of
CPUs). Thus, the cost incurred by a client is also a measure of
the performance obtained by it. Finally, we model the cost of
the system as the sum of the costs incurred by all the clients.
The selfish nature of a client in a CRAG affects the
performance seen by the other clients and can potentially
decrease the overall performance of the cloud. On the other
hand, the cloud provider wishes to maximize its resource
utilization which can in turn allow it to increase its revenue by
accommodating an increased number of clients. However, the
latter may not result in achieving the least possible cost for
each client, incentivizing the clients to change their resource
allocation. Thus, we look at a variant of CRAGs called
Stackelberg CRAGs (SCRAGs) in which we consider how the
cloud provider can ensure that the system reaches a global
optimum.
We determine various conditions to achieve a Nash equi-
librium in a CRAG. Such an equilibrium represents a stable
resource allocation to which a CRAG will converge. In a Nash
equilibrium, a client cannot increase its utility (i.e., decrease
its cost) by unilaterally changing its resource allocation. We
show that if linear cost functions are used then the cost to the
system at Nash equilibrium is at most a constant factor over the
optimal. This is the Price of Anarchy [16] in clouds. However,
in the general case, the cost of the system at Nash equilibrium
can be arbitrarily worse compared to the optimal. Thus, we
further investigate the Stackelberg equilibrium achievable in a
CRAG which ensures that the cost of the system at equilibrium
is atmost a constant times the optimal.
In summary, the main contributions of our paper are:
(a) CRAGs, which capture the conflict of interests between
clients of a cloud,
(b) SCRAGs, which capture the client-provider interactions,
(c) Conditions for equilibrium and Price of Anarchy results
in both CRAGs and SCRAGs and
(d) Algorithms to ensure close to optimal performance in
both CRAGs and SCRAGs.
II. Motivation
In this section, we provide results of an experiment that
corroborate our main hypothesis: existing resource allocation
policies can cause a client using a heavily loaded cloud to incur
unnecessarily higher costs as compared to when the cloud is
lightly loaded. The results in this section show the interactions
between multiple clients and the suboptimal performance seen
by them when simultaneously using the cloud.
We demonstrate the effect of resource contention in a cloud
environment by performing various experiments on the Illinois
Cloud Computing Testbed (CCT) [2] using Hadoop. We run
computationally intensive Hadoop Sort jobs [6] using data
generated by Hadoop’s RandomWriter [5]. We perform three
types of experiments using different input data sizes (50GB,
100GB, and 200GB): (a) No Contention: In this experiment,
a single Sort job runs without any contention from other jobs,
(b) Concurrent Jobs: In this experiment, three Sort jobs run
concurrently and we measure the effect of contention from two
of them on the third and (c) File transfer: In this experiment, a
single Sort job runs simultaneously with a HTTP file transfer
for a 3.7GB remote file. This helps us understand the effect
of contention in the network.
Figure 1 shows the time for completion of the Sort job in
each of the three scenarios discussed above, averaged over
five runs. It allows us to make two important observations.
First, the effect of network contention (File transfer) is low
for small input size; however, it causes a significant increase
in the completion time (by 25%) of the Sort job when 200GB
of input data is used. The impact of job contention on the
other hand (3 identical concurrent jobs) is much more severe; it
causes a 136% and a 173% increase in the turnaround time of a
single Sort job for 50GB and 200GB of input data respectively.
These results show that the allocation of resources to various
jobs can have a profound effect on the completion time of a
single job. Thus resource allocation is an important issue in
the cloud.
Second, with a per-CPU hour based Amazon EC2’s pricing
model, a client running a Sort job in parallel with two others
would be charged around 136% to 173% more (depending
upon the input size) as opposed to when it has exclusive access
to the cloud. This shows that pricing of cloud resources is an
important issue which needs to be addressed. In this paper, we
address the problem of resource allocation via pricing models
using game theory.
III. Cloud Resource Allocation Games
In this section, we define and present Cloud Resource
Allocation Games (CRAGs). CRAGs model the resource al-
location in a cloud and capture the provider-client and client-
client interactions. We show that a Nash equilibrium always
exists for CRAGs and derive Price of Anarchy results for it
by reducing an instance of CRAG to an instance of Selfish
Routing in a network [21]. Next, we introduce the concept of
Stackelberg CRAGs and propose mechanisms which ensure
that the cost incurred by the system at Stackelberg equilibrium
is close to the global optimum. In this paper, we only consider
a static scenario in which a set of clients submit their jobs to
a cloud as a batch. We leave modeling of the dynamics that
can exist in practice to future work.
A. Modeling resource allocation in clouds
In our model, the clients of a cloud are modeled as the play-
ers in a CRAG. A client’s strategy is represented by the client’s
resource allocation. We make the following assumptions about
the various entities involved in a cloud:
(a) The cloud hosts only one type of resource (e.g., CPU)
and all clients are concerned with the usage of this type
of resource only. The more general case with multiple
types of resources is an extension of the model described
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below if there are no dependencies between different
types of resources. Inter resource-type dependencies
(e.g., a Hadoop job might be required to be scheduled
on a machine close to its data) are outside the scope of
this paper.
(b) Each client acts selfishly and the cloud provider tries
to optimize the total utility of the clients while ensuring
efficient resource usage. Although cloud providers would
be interested in maximizing their revenue, they would
not want to charge their clients unnecessarily high prices
in order to retain them. This follows from the fact that
cloud computing is a competitive market with a choice
of multiple providers for clients.
(c) Clients are charged based on per CPU-hour consumed.
This implies that the amount of money a client has to
pay the cloud is directly proportional to the amount of
time the requested amount of resources are used by the
client. This of course assumes a fixed number of CPUs
requested by a client at a time.
(d) The cloud has sufficient amount of resources to accom-
modate the resources requested by all the clients.
Suppose a cloud provider C consists of a set M =
{1, 2, . . . ,m} of m physical resources (called machines from
here on). Each machine i ∈ M is associated with a cost
function li(·) (li : + → +) and a capacity ci. ci represents
the amount of resource available at machine i. li(x) is the
cost of using x resources at machine i. We assume that li is a
monotonic non-decreasing function such that x · li(x) is weakly
convex for every i. The set L = {l1, l2, . . . , lm} represents the
cost functions of all the machines in the cloud.
We use the function li as an abstraction for the cost incurred
by the clients who are using machine i. In practice, the cost
function associated with a machine represents the amount
of money the clients need to pay to use the machine for a
particular amount of time. It captures the interactions between
the jobs of the various clients using machine i. Since the
amount of money paid by a client for a job is directly
proportional to the time taken to finish the job, li also models
the turnaround time seen by the client.
We further assume that a set U = {U1,U2, . . . ,Un} of
n clients simultaneously use the cloud C, with client U j
requesting a total of a j resources from C. a j represents the
total amount of resource-hours that are requested by client U j.
For example, a j can be the number of CPU-hours requested
by U j. The vector A = (a1, a2, . . . , an) represents the demands
of all the clients. A global resource allocation vector Φ defines
the resources allocated by the cloud to the clients at various
machines. Φ is given by a n-dimensional vector (φ1, φ2, . . . , φn)
where each φ j maps client U j’s resource requirements to the
m machines available. φ j is the strategy adopted by client U j
in the CRAG and is given by the vector (r j(1), r j(2), . . . , r j(m))
for j ∈ 1 . . .n. r j(k) ∈ + indicates the resources allocated by
Φ to client U j at machine k. The allocation vector Φ is feasible
if it satisfies the following properties: (1) ∑mk=1 r j(k) = a j, (2)
r j(k) ≥ 0 ∀ j, k and (3) the total resource utilization Rk at
machine k is within its capacity ck i.e. Rk =
∑n
i=1 ri(k) ≤ ck.
The 3-tuple (M,L,A) defines a Cloud Resource Allocation
Game (CRAG) where player (client) U j’s strategy is given by
its resource allocation φ j. Client U j wishes to minimize its
cost which is given by
LΦ( j) =
m∑
i=1
ψ(i, j) · li(Ri)
where ψ(i, j) = 1, if machine i is used by U j in the allocation
Φ and ψ(i, j) = 0, otherwise. Thus, the cost incurred by a client
is the sum of the costs incurred by it at all the machines that
are used by it. U j tries to maximize its utility which is given
by −LΦ( j). The performance of the system is measured by the
overall cost CΦ incurred by the system due to the allocation
Φ i.e.
CΦ =
n∑
j=1
m∑
i=1
r j(i) · li(Ri)
The cloud provider is concerned about minimizing the cost CΦ
of the system which maximizes the total resource utilization
of the cloud. CΦ is a measure of the total amount of money
all the clients pay to the cloud.
Since cloud providers typically have many available ma-
chines, we do not focus on feasibility of schedules in this
paper. Rather, given a sufficiently large C, we focus on the
game theoretic issues.
B. Achieving Nash Equilibria in CRAGs
The formulation considered in Section III-A provides the
basic model for CRAGs, an instance of which is described by
the 3-tuple (M,L,A). Client Ui selfishly tries to modify its
strategy φi, in order to decrease its cost LΦ(i). However, this
could increase the cost LΦ( j) of another client U j. Here-in
lies the inherent conflict between the requirements of different
clients: each client tries to minimize the incurred cost and
changes its resource allocation (strategy) until it is unable
to decrease its cost further. Such a dynamism would persist
unless the system reaches a state in which no client can
strictly decrease its cost further. Such a state represents a Nash
equilibrium [17] and it can be formally defined for our model
as follows:
Definition 1: A feasible global resource allocation Φ =
(φ1, φ2, . . . , φn) is said to be at Nash equilibrium (and called a
Nash assignment) if ∀Ui ∈ U, LΦ(i) ≤ LΦ′ (i), for any feasible
allocation Φ′ = (φ′1, φ′2, . . . , φ′n) with φ′j = φ j for j , i and φ′i =
(r′i (1), r′i (2), . . . , r′i (m)) such that
∑m
k=1 ri(k) =
∑m
k=1 r
′
i (k) = ai.
In other words, a resource allocation is at Nash equilibrium
if no client can decrease its cost by unilaterally changing its
resource allocation, i.e., no client has any incentive to change
its current strategy.
Sub-optimality of Nash: While a Nash equilibrium rep-
resents a stable state of the system, the cost CΦ incurred
by the system due to a Nash assignment Φ need not be
globally optimal [9]. Thus, in order to investigate the optimal
performance that can be achieved in a CRAG, we formulate
the following cost optimization problem:
Minimize CΦ =
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=1
ri(k) · lk(Rk) (1)
with the following constraints:
m∑
k=1
ri(k) = ai
Rk =
n∑
i=1
ri(k) ≤ ci
ri(k) ≥ 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n , 1 ≤ k ≤ m
Equation 1 can be rewritten as
CΦ =
m∑
k=1
Rklk(Rk)
If x ·lk(x) is convex for all k, the above non-linear optimization
problem is a convex program for which the local optimal
coincides with the global optimal [19]. Denoting x · lk(x) by
Ck(x) we have CΦ = ∑mk=1 Ck(Rk). Using this representation of
CΦ and the above constraints, this optimization formulation
becomes similar to the NLP formulation for Selfish Routing
[21] with the following change in terminology: (a) “client”
in a CRAG is to be replaced with “path” in an instance of
Selfish routing and (b) “physical resource” in a CRAG is to be
replaced with “edge” in an instance of Selfish routing. Further,
the concept of flow in Selfish routing [21] is equivalent to that
of global resource allocation in CRAGs.
Thus, the equivalence of CRAGs and Selfish routing [21]
can be derived from the formulation of the optimization prob-
lems in each of them. Using this equivalence, the following
results can be shown to be true (the actual proofs parallel those
in [21]):
Theorem 1: The CRAG (M,L,A) with continuous non-
decreasing cost functions admits a feasible Nash assignment.
Further, a Nash assignment of (M,L,A) is the solution of the
following optimization problem:
Minimize CΦ =
m∑
k=1
l′k(Rk) (2)
with the following constraints:
m∑
k=1
ri(k) = ai
Rk =
n∑
i=1
ri(k) ≤ ci
ri(k) ≥ 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n , 1 ≤ k ≤ m
where l′i(x) =
∫ x
0 li(t)dt.
Theorem 2: If the CRAG (M,L,A) has linear cost func-
tions then any Nash assignment would incur a cost that is at
most 4/3 times that of the optimal assignment for it.
Theorem 1 shows that the Nash equilibrium for any CRAG
satisfying our assumptions exists, is achievable and is same as
the solution of the optimization problem given by Equation 2.
Theorem 2 gives the Price of Anarchy result in clouds in which
all cost functions are linear.
C. Stackelberg Equilibria in CRAGs
To overcome the sub-optimality of the Nash equilibrium for
arbitrary cost functions, we consider the Stackelberg variant
of CRAGs. Here the cloud provider imposes restrictions such
that the cost of the resulting Nash assignment is close to the
optimal. In this section, we first formulate a formal definition
for a Stackelberg equilibrium in a CRAG and then provide two
strategies, Aloof and Least Cost First, that attempt to ensure
that the cost of the equilibrium reached in the Stackelberg
game is close to the optimal.
Stackelberg games are a special category of games consist-
ing of two types of players: the leader, who tries to optimize
the system performance and the followers who are selfish
players, trying to optimize their own utility. While the leader
has no direct control on the followers’ strategies, they are
constrained by the strategy adopted by the leader. Thus the
leader can use his strategy to drive the system to a near-optimal
point of operation. CRAGs can be modified as Stackelberg
games in which the cloud provider acts as the leader trying
to optimize performance of the system and the clients act as
followers, selfishly trying to decrease their individual costs.
A Stackelberg CRAG (SCRAG) is characterized by a 4-
tuple (M,L,A, φL), where (M,L,A) represents a CRAG (as
defined in Section III-B) and φL = (rL(1), rL(2), . . . , rL(m)
denotes the resource allocation of the cloud provider i.e.
the strategy of the leader of the SCRAG. rL(k) denotes the
amount of resources used by the leader at machine k. The
total resource usage of the leader is given by aL =
∑m
k=1 rL(k).
The Stackelberg global resource allocation ΦS is given by the
vector (φ1, φ2, . . . , φn, φL) where φi for i = 1 . . . n is as defined
earlier. The total resource utilization at machine k is given by
RSk = rL(k) +
∑n
i=1 ri(k) ≤ ck. Thus, each client sees that the
resources at machine k are decreased by rL(k), which affects
the equilibrium reached by them. The provider’s resource
usage aL can be due to any set of jobs that are under its control.
In practice, cloud providers themselves need to run various
jobs on the cloud infrastructure that are responsible for various
tasks e.g, client job scheduling, monitoring, infrastructure
management protocols etc. Such jobs could account for the
resources aL of the leader allocated by φL.
Similar to the Nash equilibrium in simple non-cooperative
games, Stackelberg games also reach an equilibrium in which,
for a fixed strategy of the leader, no player can strictly decrease
its cost by altering its strategy alone. This represents a stable
state in which there is no incentive for any client to change
its resource allocation. We formally define the Stackelberg
equilibrium achieved in a SCRAG as follows:
Definition 2: For the SCRAG (M,L,A, φL), the Stackel-
berg global resource allocation ΦS = (φ1, φ2, . . . , φn, φL) is
said to be at Stackelberg Equilibrium (and called a Stackelberg
assignment) if Φ = (φ1, φ2, . . . , φn) is a Nash assignment for
the CRAG (M,LN ,A) where LN = {lNk | lNk (x) = lk(x+ rL(k)),
k = 1, 2, . . . ,m}.
Definition 2 shows the relation between a SCRAG and a
CRAG with a modified set of cost functions that depend on
the resources used by the leader. A Stackelberg assignment is
optimal if the cost function CΦS induced by it is the global
minimum.
The optimality of the Stackelberg equilibrium depends on
the leader’s strategy and thus is important in determining the
performance of the system. We consider two leader strategies
for SCRAGs: Aloof and Largest Cost First (LCF). These
strategies are inspired by [20].
Aloof strategy: In the Aloof strategy, the cloud provider
is indifferent to the strategies of the clients and tries to find
φL such that it is the optimal assignment for the CRAG
(M,L,AL), where M and L are as defined earlier and
AL = {aL}. A leader following the aloof strategy does not
take into account the strategies adopted by the followers and
decides upon its strategy independent of them.
Least Cost First strategy: On the other hand, in the LCF
strategy the leader uses the resources that other clients tend to
avoid, i.e., the leader uses resources that incur higher costs.
The LCF strategy is obtained using the following algorithm:
1) The leader first computes the optimal assignment Φ∗ for
the CRAG (M,L,A∗), where (M and L are as defined
earlier and A∗ = (a1, a2, . . . , an, aL). Note that such an
assignment need not be at equilibrium for the clients of
the cloud i.e., some client Ui could potentially decrease
its cost by changing φ∗i . Φ∗ can be calculated by solving
the convex program given by Equation 1 (Section III-B).
2) Order the resources such that l1(Φ∗(1)) ≤ l2(Φ∗(2)) ≤
. . . ≤ lm(Φ∗(m)) and find the minimum k∗ such that k∗ ≤
m and ∑mk=k∗ Φ∗(k) ≤ aL. Φ∗(k) is the total amount of
resources allocated by Φ∗ at machine k.
3) The strategy of the leader φ∗S L = (rL(1), rL(2), . . . , rL(m))
is given by rL(k) = Φ∗(k) for k > k∗, rL(k∗) = aL −∑m
k=k∗ Φ
∗(k) and rL(k) = 0 for k < k∗.
Thus, in the LCF strategy the leader occupies the (m − k∗)
most expensive machines and then allows the followers to
converge to a Nash Equilibrium. The following theorem shows
that the cost incurred by adopting the LCF strategy is at most
1
α
times worse compared to the optimal assignment for the
CRAG under consideration, where α indicates the fraction
of jobs that belong to the leader. The proof of this theorem
parallels that in [20].
Theorem 3: If φSL is the LCF strategy for the leader in the
SCRAG (M,L,A, φL) inducing a Nash assignment ΦSF for
the followers and Φ∗ is the optimal assignment for the CRAG
(M,L,A), then C(ΦSF ,ΦSL ) ≤
1
α
CΦ∗ where α = aL∑n
i=1 ai
.
D. CRAGs in Practice
In the earlier subsection we have shown how the resource
allocation in clouds can be modeled using CRAGs. We have
derived several results which determine the relationship of
the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria achievable in a CRAG
with the optimal solution. In this section, we show how these
mechanisms can be adopted in practice.
The resource allocation based on the equilibria takes place
in rounds as the model given in Section III-A is applicable
only to a static scenario. At the start of each round, all the
clients submit the jobs that have to be run in that round, to the
cloud. The actual set of clients can vary across rounds. If the
Stackelberg mechanism is used, the provider first calculates
his resource allocation vector φL using either the Aloof or
LCF strategy of Section III-C. The provider then advertises the
amount of resources left at each of the machines in the cloud to
the clients. Each client then chooses the machines that would
satisfy its resource requirement and minimize its total cost.
Next, the clients will actively change their resource allocation
as long as they can decrease their costs. They can follow any
of the standard update mechanisms in the literature [16] to
determine how they change their strategy. All the clients must
follow the same update mechanism.
When no client can decrease its cost by changing its strategy
alone, the system has achieved a stable equilibrium. Since
such a equilibrium state exists (Theorem 1 in Section III-B),
it will be reached with the convergence time depending on
the type of update mechanism used by the clients [16]. This
equilibrium state corresponds to one of the equilibria (Nash or
Stackelberg depending upon the mechanism adopted) defined
earlier. Such a state satisfies all the conditions outlined earlier
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Fig. 2. Results of simulations with linear cost functions and synthetic workloads: (a) Total Cost to the System, (b) Maximum cost incurred
by a client for using a machine and (c) Maximum turnaround time experienced by a client. The lines corresponding to Nash, Stackelberg
and Optimal are quite close to each other.
and the results regarding the bounds on the cost to the system
at equilibrium hold.
IV. Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we present experimental results from trace-
driven simulations performed to verify how the various equi-
libria introduced in Section III perform in practice and
how they compare to non-game theoretic resource allocation
schemes. We use both synthetic and real-world traces for
client resource requirements in these simulations. While the
former provide us the flexibility to verify how the equilibria of
Section III perform in a variety of scenarios, the latter allows
us to evaluate them in more practical scenarios.
Metrics: We use the following metrics to determine the
efficiency of resource allocation mechanisms:
(a) total cost incurred by the system,
(b) maximum cost of a machine: this measures the maxi-
mum cost that can be incurred by any client when it
uses any machine in the cloud and
(c) maximum turnaround time experienced by any client
of the cloud: this is the time between when the client
submits a job to when it is completed.
The cost incurred by a client is the total amount of money paid
by the client to the cloud. The total cost incurred by the system
is the total amount of money all the clients pay to the cloud
provider. While (a) and (b) help us measure the amount of
money clients pay to the cloud, (c) deals with the performance
obtained by the clients. These metrics measure how efficiently
a cloud is used and the performance experienced by the clients
of the cloud. In the ideal case, the total cost incurred by
the cloud should be equal to the optimal and the maximum
cost incurred by a client should be equal to the average cost
incurred by any client. Using trace-driven simulations, we
measure how various resource allocation strategies affect each
of these metrics.
Trace details: We use two different real-world traces which
represent two types of workloads that are typically encoun-
tered on clouds:
1) the PlanetLab traces [18] which contain long running
network intensive jobs and
2) the Parallel Workloads Archives [4] which typically
contain batch jobs that are relatively short-lived.
The PlanetLab trace we use is collected from a total of 69
physical PlanetLab machines. These traces provide us the
details of the slices requested by different users using the ma-
chines which we use for the values of a j’s in our model. From
the Parallel Workload Archives, we use the reduced LLNL-
ATLAS-2006, LLNL-uBGL-2006, LLNL-Thunder-2007 and
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Fig. 3. Results of simulations with exponential cost functions and synthetic workloads: (a) Total cost to the system, (b) Maximum cost
experienced by a client. The lines corresponding to Nash, Stackelberg and Optimal are quite close to each other.
LCG-2005 traces. From these, we use the number of proces-
sors and time requested by various users.
The synthetic traces in our experiments were generated as
follows: the resource requirements of a client Ui are drawn
uniformly at random between 0 and 1000 and normalized
(divided by) to the total amount of resources available in
the cloud in order to ensure that the cloud contains sufficient
amount of resources for all the clients. The total number of
physical machines in the cloud for these workloads is fixed
at 50. We vary the number of clients using the cloud and
measure the change in the various metrics we are concerned
with. This in turn measures the effect of variation of load on
the performance of the equilibrium based mechanisms in the
cloud.
Evaluation Approach: We compare the performance of
the Nash, Optimal and Stackelberg equilibria with a non-
game theoretic method, “Round-Robin”, that has been believed
to work well in systems like Hadoop. In the Round-Robin
method, the n machines in the cloud are arbitrarily numbered
from 1 . . .n. When a client schedules a job which requests
a resources at k machines each, it is scheduled on the next
k machines, chosen in a Round-Robin manner, that have the
required amount of resources left. If the required number of
machines is unavailable, the job is paused until the required
resources are freed.
We perform all the simulations using a trace-driven simula-
tor that solves the convex optimization problems formulated in
Section III using the Linear approximation method, an iterative
method for solving convex programs. The Nash equilibrium
is found by solving the optimization problem (Equation 2)
formulated in Theorem 1. The LCF strategy (with α = 0.01)
described in Section III-C is used to find the Stackelberg
equilibrium.
We use two types of functions to model the costs associated
with the machines of the cloud:
1) linear cost functions, represented as li(x) = ci · x and
2) exponential cost functions, represented as li(x) = ci·e(ki x).
These functions model the time for completion of a job
using the corresponding machines and depend on the total
resource consumption at the machine. For example, the job
completion time for a client using a machine i with 50%
resource usage is proportional to li(50). The constants ci in
these functions are proportional to the money the client has to
pay for using the corresponding resources in the cloud.
Microbenchmarks: Figure 2 compares the performance of
the various equilibria with that of the Round-Robin method in
terms of the various metrics of interest by varying the number
of clients. We use linear cost functions for these simulations
along with synthetic traces. While the total costs incurred by
the system at the equilibria closely overlap those at the optimal
(Figure 2(a)), the Round-Robin procedure performs about 15%
worse on average. The difference is more evident when the
other two metrics are taken into account. The maximum cost
incurred by using a machine (Figure 2(b)) in the Round-
Robin method is about 5 times more than that incurred while
using the equilibrium mechanisms. Similarly, the maximum
turnaround time experienced by a client in the Round-Robin
method (Figure 2(c)) is about twice compared to that seen
in the case of the equilibrium based mechanisms. Thus, we
can conclude that existing schemes like Round-Robin result
in low performance compared to resource allocation based on
CRAGs.
Figure 3 provides a comparison between the performance
of the Round-Robin mechanism and the various equilibria
for exponential cost functions. This is similar to the case of
linear cost functions and the conclusions are similar to those
for Figure 2. This shows that the effect of exponential cost
functions is similar to that of linear cost functions.
PlanetLab Experiments: The results of the simulations
performed with real-world PlanetLab based traces are shown
in Figure 4. In these simulations, we use linear cost functions.
The results with exponential cost functions are similar and
not shown. These results help us understand how the various
equilibria discussed in Section III perform in practice and how
they compare to existing scheduling strategies like Round-
Robin.
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Fig. 4. Results of simulations with linear cost functions and workloads from PlanetLab: (a) Total cost to the system, (b) Maximum cost
incurred by a client for using a machine and (c) Maximum turnaround time experienced by a client. The lines corresponding to Nash,
Stackelberg and Optimal are quite close to each other.
Figure 4(a) compares the total cost incurred by the system
while using the Round-Robin mechanism with that while using
the various equilibria of Section III. It shows that the Round-
Robin mechanism can incur around 6 times more cost than
any of the equilibrium mechanisms. Figures 4(b), (c) compare
the Round-Robin method with the equilibria in terms of the
maximum cost of a machine and maximum turnaround time
of a client and show that it can perform much worse. Further,
these figures illustrate that the worst case bounds of the
Nash and Stackelberg equilibria shown in Section III do not
necessarily arise in practice. In particular, Figure 4 shows that
the cost incurred at the equilibria is quite close to that of the
optimal.
Parallel Workload Experiments Next we provide results
of the experiments performed using traces from the Parallel
Workload archives [4]. These provide a real-world example
of batch processing jobs. Figure 5 shows the results of
these experiments using four different types of workloads:
LCG-2005(LCG), LLNL-ATLAS-2006 (LLNL-AT), LLNL-
Thunder-2007 (LLNL-Th) and LLNL-uBGL-2006 (LLNL-uB)
from [4]. Figure 5(a) shows the maximum cost that can
be incurred by a client relative to the optimal. While the
relative cost incurred at the Nash and the Stackelberg equilibria
are quite close to 1, the cost incurred by the Round-Robin
mechanism is worse by several orders of magnitude compared
to the optimal. Figure 5(b) gives the average turnaround time
experienced by the clients relative to the optimal. It shows
that the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria perform close to the
optimal while the Round-Robin is around 5% to 15% greater
than the optimal.
Summary: The simulations in this section provide us with
the following general conclusions: while Nash and Stackel-
berg equilibria result in costs close to the optimal, methods
like Round-Robin can perform much worse compared to it,
sometimes by several orders of magnitude. Performance-based
metrics like turnaround time in Round-Robin mechanism can
be several times worse (15% to 500% depending upon the sce-
nario) compared to that in the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria.
Further, the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria show similar
performance and incur costs that do not differ significantly
from the optimal for the real-world based workloads.
V. RelatedWork
In this paper, we consider the use of game theoretic ap-
proaches for resource allocation in cloud computing environ-
ments. Our goals are related to works in three areas:
Resource allocation in shared-computing environments:
Several recent works (e.g., [7], [11]) try to ensure efficient
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Fig. 5. Results of simulations with linear cost functions and workloads from Parallel Workload Archives: (a) Maximum cost incurred by a
client for using a machine and (b) Average turnaround time experienced by a client.
usage of shared resources. However, they generally adopt a
global optimization approach which does not work [15] for
cloud computing in which the resources are made public and
multiple clients share the same physical infrastructure. Unlike
earlier works, we take a comprehensive approach in this paper:
irrespective of the type of resource, our algorithms can be used
to ensure optimal allocation of that resource among the clients.
Economic approaches in shared systems: Simple reser-
vation mechanisms try to cater to the clients’ needs but do
not provide bounds on the system performance compared to
optimal solutions. On the other hand, economic approaches
can be used to ensure that clients can achieve near optimal
system performance. These approaches [10] have been used
to model and solve problems related to the supply-demand
economics of complex systems where multiple clients and
multiple providers exist. Sharp [12], Tycoon [14] and grid mar-
kets [22] are examples of such approaches in grid computing
where economic approaches have been successfully adopted to
deal with efficient resource allocation. More recently, Google
introduced an auction-based mechanism [24] for reserving
resources on their internal systems.
Game theoretic approaches in practical computing sys-
tems: In this paper, we take a game-theoretic approach
that has been widely used as a tool to achieve optimal
resource usage and to design optimal scheduling mechanisms.
Game theory [16] has been used to model several aspects of
computing systems including routing, resource allocation and
scheduling. Several works related to selfish routing [8], [21]
present game-theoretic models for routing traffic in networks
in order to optimize the latency experienced by the end users
under congestion. We draw upon these works to derive several
properties of CRAGs. Further, Stackelberg scheduling has
been used in several practical systems [13], [20] to achieve
optimal system usage by using leader strategies which ensure
that followers achieve a Nash Equilibrium whose cost (nearly)
coincides with the optimum. We exploit this property of
Stackelberg games and ensure that SCRAGs achieve a close
to optimal allocation of resources in the cloud.
Game-theoretic concepts have been applied to cloud com-
puting in [15], which introduces the concept of collocation
games. While this is most closely related to our current work,
it differs from our model of the cloud in the following ways:
(a) it assumes that there is no interaction between clients,
i.e. each client can be allocated resources without affect-
ing the performance of others,
(b) it assumes that the cloud provider’s prices for different
resources are fixed, and
(c) there is no concept of time; the price each client pays
is modeled as a constant fraction, proportional to the
amount of resource requested by it but does not depend
on the time for which it uses the resource (which implic-
itly assumes that different clients use all the resources
for the same amount of time).
Further, it only finds solutions for simple collocation games
(which capture a small subset of practical scenarios) where
clients request for a single slice on a single resource. Our
work on the other hand takes such issues into account and
deals with a more general problem by modeling the cloud
closer to reality.
VI. Conclusion and FutureWork
In this paper, we argued that fixed pricing and resource al-
location mechanisms followed by today’s cloud providers can
lead to suboptimal performance. We adopted a game-theoretic
approach to capture the subtleties of interactions between
multiple clients and the cloud provider and modeled them
as Cloud Resource Allocation Games (CRAGs). We derived
conditions for various equilibria in CRAGs, provided worst
case bounds (price of anarchy results) and gave algorithms
which ensure that the cost to the system is nearly optimal.
We further showed using extensive trace-based simulations,
that the performance of the cloud using heuristics like Round-
Robin can be about 5 times worse as compared to that
using resource allocation according to the Nash, Optimal and
Stackelberg equilibria. We also showed that, in practice, the
costs at the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are quite close to
the optimal.
Our paper opens up several exciting avenues for future
work. Although we have taken several aspects of a real
cloud computing environment into account, our model can be
extended to capture more of the complexities of today’s clouds
such as:
(a) the dependencies across multiple types of resources in
a cloud,
(b) the interactions between multiple cloud providers, and
(c) various privacy and security constraints that a user might
require, e.g, Client X may not want to be collocated with
Client Y.
We also assumed that resources are infinitely divisible which is
not true in reality. Accounting for these factors could affect the
optimality of the Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria in CRAGs.
Quantifying the effects of such factors is necessary to develop
and analyze a comprehensive model of the cloud. Further,
investigating how a market of multiple cloud providers can
be used by a set of clients efficiently (i.e., minimize the costs
incurred by them) is also a part of our future work.
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